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Crime and Mental Health Problems
in Norway—a Zero-Sum Game?
Dag Leonardsen

Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

Through a historical overview, the author analyses the Norwegian welfare society and the limits of a social-engineering approach to social
problems. While economic growth and welfare benefits expanded for
many years, so did registered crime and mental problems. This paradox
gives a justification for challenging established ways of thinking about
social prevention policies. Since the turn of the century, crime figures
have decreased while the state of mental health has worsened. The
author argues that if the price of the suppression of crime is the
depression of mind, then the gains are indeed pyrrhic.
Keywords: Social prevention, mental health, crime, social engineering,
Norway

Introduction
In the 1970s, social scientists in Norway warned against a
development in which prevention of social problems would
become increasingly more difficult as political control over the
economy was waning. Leading politicians echoed the message,
and governmental documents from this time disclosed a worry about increasing crime and drug problems concurrent with
increasing economic turbulence. The decision to open the Norwegian economy to a European and global free trade market
was synonymous with speeding up economic and social change,
while political control would shrink. However, in accordance
with social democratic ideology, the sovereign state should be
capable of providing security for all citizens and safeguarding
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social integration. For social democrats, an open economy would
not impede such a promise, since shrinking governmental control of the economic system was to be compensated for by strong
supportive measures directed towards the socio-cultural system.
Broad varieties of welfare measures were continuously developed, and the idea of putting social values first was a guiding
principle for the (Labour Party) government. Liberalism at the
base (an open, free trade based economy) was accepted as long as
one could implement social democracy in the superstructure.
Accordingly, the government gradually changed its strategies to prevent social problems. A rapid expansion of measures
directed towards the family, the educational system (schools
and kindergartens), crime and drug problems, child protection
care, etc., took place, especially from the 1970s/1980s. Program
policies built on action plans replaced a more structural and
holistic way of thinking.
However, in spite of huge social investments, governmental
as well as social science representatives continued in the following years to send worrying messages about a change in the social
climate. If the economy was running smoothly, this was not the
case with the socio-cultural system; if the politicians succeeded
in producing enough goods, they did not succeed in producing
meaning for everybody. Crime, drug problems, mental distress,
loneliness, even poverty (labelled new-poverty) gradually arose
on the political agenda. The political response to this situation
was more of the same--more and stronger measures directed towards the socio-cultural system. In spite of what social scientists
reported, no questions about systemic restrictions or value conflicts appeared. Instead, one hoped that ingenious social research
in alliance with a strong political will to spend big money would
cure the patient. The outcome was disappointing.
At the turn of the century, the picture changed. Norway, like
many other countries, experienced a turn-around trend in registered crime. It was reasonable to ask if it was the social engineering strategy that finally worked out. In 1996, Garland wrote about
“the myth of the sovereign crime control” and about limits to
state interventionist strategies. However, at the turn of the century it seemed that Garland might have been proven wrong. When
Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, two famous Swedish social scientists
and politicians, declared in the 1930s that “we can prevent—
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technically it is possible to quite a high degree—illness, crime
and asocial tendencies of different sort” (cited in Pratt, 2008, p.
130), this prophecy could now have become true—at least concerning crime. Or, is such a conclusion premature?
To answer this question we have to ask what the criteria for
success are. Western governments, in their eagerness to combat
social problems, have tended to split different symptoms of social disruption into separate and (apparently) unique sectors,
each with their own specialized strategies. This way, social
problems have been turned into social engineering challenges
that should (and could) be handled by way of professional guidance. However, while (the majority of) registered crime in Norway has decreased during the last 15 years, mental problems
have not. It seems that a positive trend in the war against crime
has been accompanied by a comparative growth in mental suffering. Accordingly, one could ask if mental health problems in
today’s Norway merely represent another symptom (in addition
to crime) of an unchanged (or even worsened) social climate—a
climate in which the struggle for recognition and respect are as
challenging as ever, but where social strain is expressed in a different way than before. Have striking in problems (like mental
suffering) replaced striking out problems (like crime)? If this is
the case, this should be a challenge even for criminologists.
In this article, I shall first describe, primarily referring to
written public documents, the main changes in social problems and social prevention strategies in Norway since WWII,
and document how the government gradually changed focus
concerning how to prevent social problems. This change was
based on the assumption that welfare policy strategies could
compensate for a lack of macro-economic control. As a part of
this account, I shall present what the politicians themselves described as “the welfare paradox”: the fact that crime and other
social problems increased in parallel with a huge expansion of
different preventive measures. Why did a combination of economic prosperity and social welfare investments not produce
(as expected) less crime (until the turn of the century) and less
social strain?
Next, I shall address the interesting observation that, from
the turn of the century, registered crime decreased, while
mental health problems seemed to increase. How can we
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explain this paradox? While it is impossible to prove any strict
causal link between these two observations, I want to present a
hypothesis (nothing more than that) that the relationship could
be more than coincidental. Are the decreasing crime figures
an indication that our society has become more socially integrated, or are social tensions today only expressed in another
language? Is much of present-day crime prevention a type of
window-dressing strategy that replaces one type of problem
(crime) with another type of problem (mental distress)? Criminologists have argued that people in Japan, due to Confucian/
Buddhist/ Shintoist values, are policing themselves—hence so
little crime in this country (Leonardsen, 2004). In this article
I ask if a neo-conservative/neo-liberalist set of values fill the
same disciplining role as “Asian”’ values do in Japan. The result
might be less crime, but at the cost of more problems, like eating
disorders, suicide, anxiety, depression, alcohol/drug dependency, electronic addiction/gambling, etc. As pointed out by Young
(1999, p. 156), there is a sense in which the conservatives are
completely correct: “If you wish to maintain an orderly society
which is in essence unfair and inequitable you must train the
individuals within it to accept the world as it is.” Maybe the
Norwegian coin that shows little crime on its upper side has
another side that discloses a strenuous social climate.
In line with Wilkinson and Pickett (2010, p. 26), one could
dispute strategies where health and social problems “tend to
be treated by policy makers as if they were quite separate from
one another, each needing separate services and remedies.”
Low crime rates are not all there is to “a good society.” Even
though crime figures might be used as radar for reporting interesting qualities about a society, one should not draw rapid
conclusions from law-abidingness to social harmony (as the
case of Japan might illustrate, see Leonardsen, 2004, 2010). What
type of actions (for example, alcohol consumption) that happen
to fall into the category of “crime,” or, alternatively, are defined
as “social (but not legal) problems” will vary in time (historically) and space (culturally)? Crime is like a sponge (Christie,
2004) that can absorb a broad variety of actions. If criminology
is the study of crime, and crime is ephemeral, one can easily
see that it is problematic to delimit criminology to fluctuating
formal criteria (i.e., what is forbidden by law). If less crime is
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accompanied by increased mental depression, little is gained,
and one could ask if criminologists should focus more on general social conditions and less on crime in itself. By asking these
questions, this paper engages in the debate on “public criminology” (Christie et al., 2011; Loader & Sparks, 2011) and “public
sociology” (Burawoy, 2005), asking the pertinent question: what
is (really) the problem? Based on my historical presentation on
the next pages I want to pay attention to a tendency among politicians to abdicate from a value-based debate on social problems and instead confine oneself to a sectored, professionalised
(evidence-based), and (often) instrumental approach.
Let me start with an overview of the way Norwegian authorities have interpreted and reacted to social problems since
1945. What did “giving priority to social prevention” mean in
different periods?

Norway 1945-2016: From Economic
to Socio-cultural Intervention
Crime prevention in Norway started out as a fight against
poverty and a struggle for universal social inclusion. Crime was
regarded as only one of many different expressions of social
problems related to deprivation. The solution to the crime problem (and other social problems) was to create a socially integrated society through national control of the economy (from regional and labor market policy to housing policy), and a strong
redistributive welfare state (universal social benefits). This approach was the recipe that would bring society into social harmony. The inspiration from Keynes and Beveridge was obvious.
What little crime there was would vanish because of collective
redistributive action; this was the social democratic credo.
Accordingly, work and welfare became two sides of the same
coin. The anticipation was that all types of social problems would
fade as economic growth, full employment, and a universal social security system was safeguarded. The Ministry of Finance
and the Ministry of Labour became the two dominant institutions to remove distress, insecurity, and inequality. There was
no disagreement that there was a complete overlap of interests
between the economic and the socio-cultural system. What was
beneficial for Norway, Inc. was beneficial for its citizens. “The

28

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

Construction State” became almost synonymous to “The Welfare
State,” and abolishing crime and other social problems could be
converted into a question of money to meet well-known needs
(and not, as later on, a question of knowledge and expertise to
meet complex human needs). The period from 1945 and into the
1960s was a period of optimism and enthusiasm.
However, reading governmental papers and the party programs of the (governing) Labour Party (LP) from the mid-1960s
discloses an increasing uneasiness about social conditions in
the country. A White Paper published in 1960 (Ministry of Social Affairs, 1960–1961), reported that the crime increase was
“explosive.” As a background to understanding this development, Labour Party Leader Trygve Bratteli talked in 1965 at the
Labour Party National Conference (LPNC) about the profound
economic and technical changes that had taken place since 1945,
and continued:
Modern societies—to an increasing extent characterized by
science and technical innovation—seem to have entered an
essentially new type of development. What is happening is
that some very profound changes take place at a very high
speed. However, these rapid changes that take place in the
everyday lives of ordinary people will lead to uneasiness and
uncertainty, and it will lead to significant industrial and social problems. (LPNC 1965, p. 147)

Increasing crime was an often-cited illustration of this “uneasiness.” At the time of Bratteli’s speech, crime had been on a continuous upward trajectory for many years, and the registered
number of crimes investigated by the police (per 100.000 inhabitants) doubled through the 1960s. The Labour Party’s Principal
Program from 1969 reported:
Even in societies that have reached the highest material and
technical level of standard one can register discontent, human callousness, conflicts and dissatisfaction. The industrial society has not succeeded in developing human ways of
being together that satisfies basic social and psychological
needs. We experience that people are alienated and that the
competitive society and the one-dimensional cultivation of
material goods generate a barren and empty life for many
people. (Labour Party, 2001)
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To the extent that this description gives a fair portrait of the
situation, the political ambition of “economic growth and contentment” from the early 1960s had been only partly achieved.
While the long-term program from 1957 had promised to “pay
close attention to preventive health and social work” (The Ministry of Finance, 1957, p. 72), in the early 1970s public documents
and social research indicated that something had gone wrong
(e.g., book titles such as “The Myth of the Welfare State” [Norway] and “The Hollow Welfare State” [Sweden]). The sudden
increase in social security expenditures (the old means-tested
poor law) represented only one worrying facet, as well as increasing crime and drug problems. The politicians had to admit
that the power balance between market forces and political control had developed in favor of the former:
Largely we are still hampered by insufficient tools for political control. We have too little knowledge about the society
we want to change and the world we are a part of. We have
to obtain more knowledge, more statistics, and more research
documentation in all fields of importance for the change of
society. (Kleppe, LPNC, 1969, p. 158)

The perspective Per Kleppe—one of the main strategists behind the Labour Party policy—presented, was twofold: (1) A socially integrated society was dependent on political control over
the economy; and (2) proper political control was dependent on
knowledge-based documentation and valid statistical information. In other words, the realization of the welfare state ideal
had to be based on a happy marriage between political voluntarism and the developing social sciences. Since the economists
had been successful in saving a wrecked economy in the 1930s
(e.g., Keynes), it was now reasonable to expect that the social
scientists could help in solving the evolving problems in the
socio-cultural system. Party Leader Trygve Bratteli commented
on this:
During a period of huge changes and reform of our society, we have to give priority to the science about man and
his environment, about the body and the health of our soul,
about contact and living together, about human society and
about human history. In every regard we have to invite the
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help that science to an increasing extent can supply us with.
(LPNC, 1965, p. 149)

Since the politicians assumed that social problems could be
solved through a confident cooperation between themselves and
social science researchers, these problems did not provoke any
political questions regarding value priorities. Strong political
commitment to intervene in the market processes in combination
with a comparable strong belief in the problem-solving capability
of the social sciences was what it took to stem crime and social
uncertainties. Due to a well-equipped toolbox, no one should fear
for his/her overall living conditions. In Norway, the government
took control via a broad set of policy strategies.
However, with Kleppe’s declarations about lack of political
control over the economy, the political priorities in the next decenniums might seem surprising. While until the early 1970s
politicians had had at their disposal governmental instruments
that could soften some of the negative effects of the liberalized
market economy, they now headed towards a further weakening
of their own political control. Already in 1960, Norway joined the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which meant a gradual deconstruction of customs and tariff barriers. The immediate
result was rapid geographical changes with extensive social ramifications. Then, from the mid-1970s, an international depression
resulted in a paradigmatic change in economic thinking. Keynesian “demand-side economy” had to give way. From then on,
monetarist principles “became the international policy to which
all governments committed to an open world economy felt obliged
to subscribe” (Gamble 1986, p. 34, italics added). The space for
political manoeuvre, even in social democratic-oriented Norway,
was in decline. This represented a serious political dilemma:
I will go as far as to say that I do not think we are able to
carry out our aims as for our welfare policy in a society that
is so strongly dominated by capitalist influence as Norway is
today. The implementation of our welfare program takes as a
premise quite a radical change of society. We are not running
for ”adaptation policy.“ (Kleppe, LP’s Conference on welfare
politics, 1971, pp. 81–82)
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In a situation with increasing social problems (the concept
of the “client producing system” now became common), and
with weakened political control of important economic variables, how was the government, with all its political ambitions
regarding social prevention, to handle these challenges?
In a speech to the National Congress in 1971, Minister of
Social Welfare Odd Højdahl declared that it had come as a big
surprise that social problems escalated in parallel to economic affluence and social reforms being attained: “[We] thought
that the abolishment of mass poverty, improved housing, and
better educational and working conditions, would make main
elements of the welfare policy superfluous. However, it was not
that simple” (LPNC 1971, p. 230). This “welfare paradox” (less
poverty, more crime and social problems) was hard to understand for those politicians who had their historical background
in the 1930s (high unemployment) and the 1940s (war economy).
However, with the given priorities, there were no options
for turning. “The strong demands for efficiency and productivity in different sectors of society make many people fall by the
wayside,” Højdahl declared, but “the only solution is further
economic growth. I will ask you not to equal economic growth
with social problems” (LPNC 1971, pp. 254–255). The general
perspective was (like in 1945) that what was good for the economy was good for people in general. Accordingly, the way of
understanding the social problems of the 1970s was much the
same as in 1945: it was through rapid (free trade-based) economic growth in combination with a broad variety of governmental
measures that a crime resistant and socially integrated society
could be sustained. The governing optimism was unaffected.
Even though the Labour government through the first half
of the 1970s had demonstrated a strong will to implement an
extensive welfare policy (including regional, industrial, financial and labour measures), gradually the general economic development in Europe changed. A process of abdication from
political control of the economy became increasingly dominant
at a time when the impetus for change escalated (Norway became a turbulent oil economy in 1969, while at the same time
the government prepared for Norwegian participation in the
EU). However, the political ambitions remained the same. Taking care of soft values was more important than ever. Within
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the framework of what was called a “new welfare policy,” the
Labour Party continuously talked about “giving social values
pre-eminence,” underlining that from that point on social values should be a premise for all types of policy planning. Stronger focus was directed at developing what was called “self-supporting networks,” not least because one had gradually reached
an awareness that “the state cannot make people happy.” All
these declarations were formulated at the same time as the
winds of change were accelerating. The “panting competition
society” (Vice-President Reiulf Steen, LPNC, 1973, p. 62) should
from now on be transformed in the direction of “a real equal
society where people have a chance of experiencing peace and
prospects for developing all their abilities” (Steen, p. 62). However, such an ambitious aim could (according to Steen) be attained only if stronger measures were introduced:
For the Labour Party there should be absolutely no doubt
concerning the main perspective: by intervening directly
into the societal system, by removing the causes of the problems, through the regional policy, through measures like
rehabilitation allowance and rehabilitation employment, we
will reach a society with people that function in accordance
to their talents rather than investing a lot of money to repair
damages evolving due to cold and inhuman conditions of
competition in the labour market and in society in general.
(LPNC, 1973, p. 66)

In short, the government continued having high ambitions
for building what in political terms was designated a qualitatively better society. The trust in the social sciences for supporting the politicians with the necessary know-how to maneuver
in a complex and mobile society remained uncontested. Facing
the question of how much change society could take, the Minister of Education and Research declared that “one of the most
important tools for political governing that should be implemented is an action program for social research” (Førde, 1980).
The challenge was to make the social sciences a helping hand to
solve the contradiction between mobility and how much turbulence people could take.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Labour Party Program
(1981) described the social climate in Norway as follows:
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The strong economic growth has had its price…The rapid
changes have created uneasiness, alienation and insecurity
about the future. New human problems have appeared: new
illnesses and new troubles. Drug abuse increases…Beneath
the surface of wealth, we can find huge human and social
problems that are unsolvable within the present system of
dominating capitalistic features. (Labour Party, 2001, p. 14)

The Party Leader, Reiulf Steen, declared in 1981 that, “not at any
time since WWII has social security been more vulnerable than
now” (LPNC, 1981, p. 58).
Vice President Einar Førde expressed his worries by saying
that “we can fill up a medium big Norwegian city with children
suffering from what is known as ’serious lack of care’” adding
that the youngsters’ optimism for the future had changed in the
direction of pessimism and fear. The No-Future Generation had
arrived. In 1983, social scientist Kolberg published a book titled “The Welfare State—Goodbye?” Five years later, Marklund
(Sweden) published “Paradise Lost? The Nordic Welfare States
and the Recession 1975–1985.” Both titles indicate the focus of
the welfare state debate all through the period 1980–2010.
These were the years of a general right wing turn in politics.
Norway, now economically strengthened through its new status
as an oil nation, was no exception to this general trend of welfare
contraction. The Labour Party’s hegemonic status was shrinking.
During the period 1981–86/1989–90, and 1997–2000/2001–2005,
Norway had conservative/centre-right governments inspired by
neo-liberal thinking. While the Norwegian Labour Party held a
rhetorical distance from this ideology, the neo-liberal influence
was identifiable also within the social democratic camp. For one
thing, during the 1980s and 1990s the party strengthened the
course towards further European integration. After the party
had lost a referendum in 1972 about Norwegian membership in
the EU, a new proposal was launched in 1994. Once again, the
Norwegian electorate voted No. Nevertheless, the Labour Party was a driving force for connecting Norway tighter with the
European free trade market. When the campaign for full membership in the EU failed, the strategy (which succeeded) was to
make Norway a member of the European internal market. The
implication of this was more power delegated to Brussels and to
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market forces, and, in spite of earlier claims, a weakening of national political power.
Furthermore, during the period with a conservative government (1981–1986), key members of the Labour Party prepared
an ideological shift away from governmental and bureaucratic
solutions, heavily dependent on taxation and centralized arrangements, and invited a new debate on freedom, modernization and market solutions. This took place at the National
Congress in 1987. As Norway had become more integrated
into the European, as well as the global economy, one had to
acknowledge that, “the task for political organisations should
be the setting of political aims and defining the framework.
After that, it is the leaders’ and their employees’ challenge to
reach the given aims. We believe this will redeem innovation
and engagement” (Brundtland, LPNC, 1987, p. 21). Due to stronger demands among the electorate for more individualized and
tailor-made services, one should, Brundtland argued, be more
sensitive to such demands. The main challenge was to see that
services were offered on equal terms. Accordingly, it would be a
good strategy to bring competition into the public sector. From
mixed economy to mixed administration—this was the message. The choice between public and private operation had to
be made according to what was most convenient for reaching
the given aim. Furthermore, people had to show more responsibility themselves: “It is a main challenge to follow a strategy
where people are empowered to handle their problems themselves” (Brundtland, LPNC 1987, p. 134). One precaution was
taken: “We shall offer no compromises when it comes to stating
that health, social security and education are so basic common
needs that we will not allow commercialisation of these services. In this connection I will recommend dogmatism,” Førde
concluded (LPNC, 1987, p. 73).
How did this ideological shift affect the social climate in the
country? Had the politicians’ promises about giving priority to
social prevention and the alliance with the social sciences produced a better society?
Social research, public documents, as well as party programmes, disclose a rather worrying answer to these questions.
In the Labour Party’s program for 1986-89, one could read that “a
big and increasing number of children and youngsters are being
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neglected, maltreated; they drop out of school and end up drifting. Queues for getting financial assistance are increasing” (e.g.,
increasing unemployment rates and increasing housing costs)
(Labour Party, 1986–1989, p. 74). In the 1990s, worrying signals
referred to “too many children getting too little care and supervision,” and cases of incest, child maltreatment and children living
on the streets represented illustrations of this (LP Election Manifesto 1990–1993, p. 53).
The Labour Party Program from 1992 declared that “loneliness, fear, increase in psychiatric sufferings, increase in suicides, even among children and young people, indicate that
time and efforts do not suffice for giving the necessary care we
should offer each other” (Labour Party, 1992, pp. 15–16).
An increase in crime (especially serious crimes) was part of
the picture (until the turn of the century): while in 1980 there were
3.3 persons per 1.000 charged for crime, this figure increased to
6.4 in 1998 (The Ministry of Finance, 2000–2001). In the “Principles and Values” program from 1996, the Labour Party talked
about problems like lack of social network in society, little reciprocity and contact among people, increasing crime, drug abuse,
and mental illness. Suicide was one of the most frequent reasons
for death among young people, mirroring increasing loneliness
and social isolation among people in general. In 1996, Party Leader Jagland announced that a new under-class and new class divisions were emanating. At the turn of the century, poverty had
become an essential problem to combat; some 70,000 children
were living below the poverty level (LP Election Manifesto, 2001–
2005); “many children are not in a position to have their dinner
every day; they never go for a holiday; they cannot participate in
school excursions” (Jagland, LPNC 2000, p. 6). A national committee reporting on the situation within Child Welfare Protection
(NOU, 2000, p. 12) claimed that the challenges were formidable,
and that preventive work had been neglected. Marginalizing
forces in all fields of upbringing were described as very strong.
The committee presented 50 recommendations, warned against
simplistic solutions, and underlined the importance of focusing
the value foundation in the social preventive work. In a White
Paper (Ministry of Social and Health Affairs, 2001–2002), the
government addressed eating disorders, loneliness and isolation
problems, lack of care, maltreatment, behavioural misconduct,
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drug problems, bullying, and lack of well-being as the most serious challenges. Headache, depression, and stomach/back pains
among youth signalled serious and extensive psychosocial problems. Another White Paper (The Ministry of Finance, 2000–2001)
expressed worries about pressure regarding sex, competition,
work, commerce, and scarcity of time.
Indicators on stress, dropout from school, reports to the
Child Welfare Services, loneliness, suicide, drugs, use of antidepressants, and sleeping pills, disclosed a negative development.
According to the governmental “Strategy plan for social prevention” (Government, 2009), the share of young people having big
problems or experiencing social maladjustment seemed to increase rather than decrease. In a broad study on living conditions
among youth, the research institution NOVA (2014) reported
about a well-adapted (little crime) and largely home-staying generation, but with mental challenges (stress). The most recent data
(Bakken, 2017) confirms this picture, but warns against a marked
increase in self-reported depression, especially among young
girls. The number of respondents reporting about experience of
loneliness is the highest ever. The Norwegian Institute of Health
(Bang Nes & Clench-Aas, 2011) has documented an increase in
the use of tranquilizers, ADHD medication, antidepressants and
sleeping pills, as well as more people receiving disability benefits. Nowadays, the leading reason for people being absent from
work is anxiety and depression (Olsen & Nystuen, 2017). In his
annual speech 2017, the Director of FHI had exclusion of youth
as main focus in his presentation. Mjaavatn and Frostad (2016)
report that 22% of girls (only 3,5% of the boys) in high school
(aged 16) suffer from emotional problems—a doubling of figures
in the span of twelve years. Prescription of antidepressants increased by 57% from 2004 to 2014 among girls 15–19 years. Lack
of self-confidence and dissatisfaction with their own bodies is
an often-mentioned problem among these girls. These days, the
Norwegian government is preparing for a new curriculum in
schools, called “coping with life.”
While the referenced data may indicate that mental health
problems in Norway have become more pronounced, the crime
trend appears to have turned downwards. Taking all the necessary precautions about the difficulties in reading crime statistics
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(including victim statistics), I take as a given premise for the further discussion that Norway (like many other modern societies)
has become a less crime-prone society the last 15 years. From
this outset I shall now move from the historical-descriptive presentation to the analytical-normative discussion, and ask what
is really gained if less crime is accompanied by more social
stress? Are we facing a kind of zero-sum game where victories
in crime prevention correspond to losses in mental well-being?
What kind of challenge does the new pattern of crime and social problems present to criminologists?

Discussion: Crime and Mental Stress—Depression
of Mind Through the Suppression of Crime?
First, there are many nuances to the story presented above.
The UN has for 12 consecutive years declared Norway to have
the best living conditions in the world. Norway (and the Nordic welfare state model in general) has on many occasions been
declared a success—even by The Economist (2013). I agree with
these positive evaluations. However, my query is not if the good
reputation is well deserved, but to ask whether Norwegian society in the present phase of the celebrated welfare state should
be more alert to “silent suffering,” and ask if young people these
days increasingly channel their stress and frustration inwards
rather than outwards. Rampant crime will generally trigger
populist and (often) punitive reactions that, in turn, will instigate political responses. Rampant mental problems, however,
are not threatening public order in the same way and can therefore more easily pass under the political radar. But these problems are no less damaging for the social integration in a society
than crime is.
My historic overview has shown that the hope of finding the
sociological (socio-cultural system) correspondent to Keynes
(economic system) was too optimistic. When the economy broke
down in the 1930s, Keynes found the recipe to restore the balance in the economic system. The social scientists of the 1970s
(and forwards) were unable to do the same towards the socio-cultural system (with the exception from crime post 2000).
In Sweden (another member of the celebrated Nordic Welfare
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State), the social scientist Bo Rothstein (2009, p. 126) expressed
his worries about this situation with this statement:
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to regard the development
of increasing mental problems among children and youth as
a very destroying civilization critique that should lead to a
fundamental re-evaluation among researchers concerning
the focus of Swedish welfare research. This is not the case.
Instead, one propagates about how well the Nordic welfare
model works to create good health for people, and the questions related to problems among children and youth are ignored…Something has to be fundamentally wrong when
such a rich society with a well-developed welfare policy produces that many unhappy children and youth.

This observation is, as we have seen, highly relevant for
Norway as well, and Rothstein touches upon the central challenge in my presentation: high welfare expenditures in one of
the world’s richest countries do not pay off very well when it
comes to mental well-being. The inner strain in the Norwegian
society is probably no less today than 20, 30, or 40 years ago.
The opposite might be the situation. Even though decreasing
crime should be appreciated, for a sociologist it is the broad picture covering both striking out and striking in problems that
matters. How can we understand “the crime—mental health
enigma” in context? Of course, statistical co-appearance does
not signify a causal relationship, but this should not prevent
us from asking if discipline/control/early intervention strategies in criminal policy could have repercussions when it comes
to mental health. As a starting point for my discussion, let me
present an analytical model.
My sociological presumption is based on the following
premises:
•

The socio-cultural system: if individuals (qua individuals)
and societies (qua collectivities), are to thrive, some basic
values have to be safeguarded. The better these values are
taken care of, the better are the chances for optimizing social integration and social welfare (little crime and sound
mental health).
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The economic system: if an open free market economy is
to prosper, there are other (often contradictory) values that
have to be given precedence. Figure 1 represents an ideal
type presentation of these respective values.

Figure 1: Ideal type of the economic and the socio-cultural
system

The space does not permit an elaboration of each couple of
concepts (see Leonardsen, 2015). It suffices to say that taken as
ideal types (in Max Weber’s sense) there is an obvious value
conflict between the two systems. This means that when the
balance between these two sets of values changes, one will
easily (but not nomothetically) experience a zero-sum situation.
As documented above, during the last thirty years, the economic value system has increasingly gained precedence at the cost
of the socio-cultural value system. What one side has gained,
the other has lost. The result has been a tougher social climate.
In “Crime in Japan: Paradise Lost?” (Leonardsen, 2010) I
asked if Japan (around 2010) was facing a situation where “the
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suppression of crime” had come at the price of “the suppression of mind?” Like in Norway, Japanese society had succeeded
in turning a negative crime trend through the 1990s, but experienced, at the same time, an increase in suicides and social
withdrawal (hikikomori) among youth. One used to say about
Japanese people that they are “policing themselves” (Bailey,
1976) due to a Confucian/Buddhist ideology based on self-reflection, shame, and discipline (Leonardsen, 2004). The impact
of this cultural superstructure has been a strong counter-force
against striking out processes rooted in rapid economic and social change in Japan. Accordingly, low crime rates in this country have been explained in cultural terms (Confucianism/Buddhism as vaccination against crime).
Moving our eyes to the West, it is relevant to ask to what
extent neo-liberalism (cf. free trade economy) and neo-conservatism (more individual responsibility) could be described as
functional equivalents to Confucianism/Buddhism in Japan.
Do both these (originally) Western thought systems generate
strong self-control with their accompanying self-blaming consequences? Slogans like “Back to Basics” (the British Conservatives, 1995) and “Back to Family Values” (the first Bush administration) have had their corresponding, government-initiated
campaigns in Norway (a special “Value Commission” in 1998),
with a message connoting much of the self-disciplining Asia
value foundation. I am not arguing that neo-liberalism and
neo-conservatism are ideological cousins of Confucianism/
Buddhism. Neither am I saying that Norway is England or the
U.S. It is not. However, I am asking whether the consequences
of an economic man model in alliance with a moral conservatism, of which we can find elements of even in Norway, might
be comparable at the individual level. The distance between an
Asian shame culture and a Western, neo-liberal culture, based
on a de-centred way of governing, with auto-regulated or auto-correcting individuals, might not be so big.
A starting point for such a discussion could be the work of
French philosopher Dufour (2008), who in his book “The Art of
Shrinking Heads: On the New Servitude of the Liberated in the
Age of Total Capitalism,” has questioned the effects of neo-liberalism on people’s mental health. According to Dufour, the
Kantian “critical subject” and the Freudian “neurotic subject”
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has in post-modern society been replaced by a “post-modern
subject” (Dufour talks about “an anthropological mutation”),
characterized by flexibility, adaptability—and rootlessness. In
post-modern society, the autonomous subject experiences strong
pressure to create her/his own unique identity. In the era of “liquid modernity” (Bauman, 2000), the individual inhabits a borderless space with apparently total freedom, and a “with consumption as all things” aim and meaning. The market has become
the ultimate rationality for guiding us. The problem is that the
market cannot create meaning. Dufour raises the challenging
question of whether neo-liberalism has made people internalise
the old slogan “every man the architect of his own fortune.” If
one fails in a society with so many options, there is no one to
blame but oneself. This might easily generate self-repressing and
self-controlling mechanisms that can manifest as mental health
problems. These problems (like depression, drug addiction, etc.)
are not epiphenomena constructed by the media but signs of a
crisis that especially affects young people (Dufour, 2008).
The same perspective is echoed in the debate on positive
thinking. Schwartz (2015, p. 4) writes about mental problems
in modern society (“an explosive growth of depression,” p. 3)
where an individualistic culture biases people towards making
causal attributions that focus on internal rather than external
causal factors. People are told they are free to choose, while a
substantial many rather experience a lack of control in their
lives. Davis (2015, p. 4), focusing on what he calls “The happiness industry,” argues that, “the future of successful capitalism
depends on our ability to combat stress, misery, illness, and put
relaxation, happiness and wellness in their place.” Those in a
competitive society who do not keep up with demands turn
their disappointments inwards instead of outwards.
In Norway, the media debate on youth and mental health
problems has for some years centred on concepts like “Generation Clever” or “Generation Performance” (cf. the PISA
examinations). Private company language, like “deliver the
goods” and “it’s all up to you,” has become common speech
not only within the economic system, but in the socio-cultural
system as well (schools and even kindergartens). Everyone has
to pull her/his weight.
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Changes in mental health conditions in a society are hard
to interpret and analyze, and perhaps Dufour (2008) and other
scholars of worry are painting a too dreary picture of life in
post-modern society. However, my historical overview, and the
fact that The World Health Organisation (WHO) has identified
depression as the number two cause of death (prospected to be
number one in 2030) in Western countries, should invite a discussion on how to interpret the development of mental health
problems during the last few years (Ehrenberg, 2010). Even
though it is difficult to understand what we are really measuring when we talk about mental problems (for example, what
amount of change is due to a growth in diagnoses and diagnosing professions, and what is due to real changes?), compared to
the huge amount of money spent on mental disorder prevention, the situation is paradoxical.
When Merton (1968) presented his anomie theory (notice:
also called strain theory), he wrote (in a Durkheimian spirit)
about different types of adaptation to disjunctions between
goals and means in a society. People could strike out as “innovators” or “rebels,” but, alternatively, they could strike inwards
and become “retreatists.” The relevant point for my discussion
is that strain in a society can have many different outlets, of
which crime is but one. Of course, decreasing crime rates should
be celebrated as a pleasant and likely indication of social integration, but not without precautions (see Christie, 2004). It is the
total picture of deviance that should have the main attention,
even for criminologists.
A society’s health condition taken as a whole is dependent
on many different variables, and these variables should be seen
in connection to each other. When Freud in 1929 wrote about
“Civilization and its Discontents,” he wrote about human pain
due to the conflict between Eros (love) and Thanatos (death).
Nowadays, this cultural discontent should rather be presented
in Mertonian terms as a clash between cultural goals (success)
and certain groups’ lack of access (by conventional means) to
achieving those goals. In a modern version of Merton, Jock
Young (2007, p. 32) talks about the bulimic society, “where massive cultural inclusion is accompanied by systematic structural
exclusion”—a society that both absorbs (through mass media,
mass education, consumer markets, etc.) and rejects (through
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unequal chances of taking full advantage of these arenas). Accordingly, the combination of cultural inclusion and economic
exclusion is for Young the key to the humiliation and resentment
experienced by those with the least resources. “The exclusive
society” (Young, 1999) is a society that produces relative deprivation and ontological insecurity in a way that is denigrating
and humiliating. Not having access to even the lower reaches of
the labour market, failing to achieve in a middle-class-oriented
school system, or living in poverty amidst affluence, is likely to
produce tensions with outcomes that can strike inwards as well
as outwards.
Having this broader perspective in mind, I end my presentation about the successful Norwegian welfare society by being
a “mood killer.” In spite of all the well-deserved praise of this
model, there is reason to listen carefully to the aforementioned
comment by Bo Rothstein, namely that the mental health situation among young people today might be taken as a very civilization destroying critique. Something is wrong when so much
money is spent on welfare measures, but still so many are unhappy about their lives.
The question remains: how should this challenge be met? If
Wilkinson and Pickett are correct (2010), politicians should stop
treating social problems as separate phenomena with no internal connections. Doctors and nurses treat ill health, police and
prisons deal with crime, remedial teachers and educational psychologists tackle educational problems, and social workers and
other health-promotion specialists deal with “the rest.” The results of all these interventions are modest, while new problems
are continuously recreated. An open market economy based on
liberalistic principles is hard to combine with a political and sociological demand for equality, which, in turn, is important for
social integration. No doubt, Norway has pursued a policy of
equality over many years. However, this policy of re-distribution has not been enough to prevent increasing social problems.
Neither have a huge number of action plans (from bullying- and
poverty- to crime- and drug-programs) had the expected outcomes (Leonardsen, 2015). So what conclusion could be drawn
from this paradox?
My intention is not to undermine the importance of practical, short-term, and imaginative social reforms. Solving problems
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will often invite delimited actions based on scarce resources.
However, if the floor is wet, we should not restrict our efforts to
wiping up with a rag. Someone has to look for the open water tap,
and check if it can be turned off. At different times through the
last forty years, Labour governments in Norway did recognize—
at the rhetorical level—that it would be difficult, even impossible, to find social preventive measures that would work without
political control of the economy. Since that time, this control has
declined essentially. According to Fukuyama (1999, p. 4), “there
is a widespread acknowledgement that in post-industrial societies further improvement cannot be achieved through ambitious
social engineering.” The case of Norway, where such ambitions
have reached unprecedented levels, should represent an interesting starting point for elaborating Fukuyama’s thesis.
Author’s note: Originally, the Labour Party documents were studied at
The Norwegian Labour Movement Archives and Library in Oslo (https://
www.arbark.no/InEnglish.htm). Later this material was digitized, and
those documents are cited in this paper.
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